You’ve got the ASOG, so now you’ve got to follow it

  • DP Event
  • Published on 29 July 2024
  • Generated on 15 November 2024
  • DPE 02/24
  • 3 minute read

Incident

This case study examines an incident that occurred on an equipment class 2 MODU, during well intervention operations.

1. Overview

The unit was operating in open bus configuration with all four thrusters operational and four of the six generators connected, two on either side of the bus.

2. What happened?

There had been reports of noise and heavy vibrations coming from a sea water cooling pump, allocated to Thruster No.1, therefore the engineers requested the DPOs to deselect and stop Thruster No.1 from the DP system, so investigations could be carried out. The DPOs agreed to the request, reducing the available thruster capacity on the portside to 50%.

Approximately half an hour later, a blackout on the starboard power system resulted in the loss of Thruster Nos. 2 and 3. 

The DPOs took immediate action and changed over to Manual control, facilitating disconnection of equipment by the crews between the MODU and the platform. The DPOs were able to maintain MODU position on the one remaining thruster, Thruster 4, from the port redundancy group. Starboard side power was restored and Thrusters 2 and 3, were running and accepted back into the DP control system within seven minutes.

The crew were instructed to continue the disconnection and once all end-user equipment was safely removed, the MODU commenced its passage out of the 500m zone. The starboard redundancy group experienced a second blackout whilst transiting out of the safety zone and the MODU was again left with only one thruster to complete the move beyond the 500m zone.

The crew were able to safely transit the MODU to a nearby anchorage where they then undertook further diagnostics and remediation of the failures.

Figure – Simplified power & thruster allocation

3. Findings

Investigation of the event concluded that:

  • The failure of Thruster 1 sea water cooling pump was due to shaft bearing damage.
  • Blackout of the starboard power system was due to the malfunction of a running diesel generator control module; this produced an incorrect signal to the AVR and consequently affected both connected diesel generators.
  • ASOG had not been adhered to during operation inside 500m zone. Any loss/failures of any DP related equipment should trigger yellow status and all parties should be informed.
  • There was poor communication between Bridge, engine room and third-party contractors.
  • Any activity related to the operation needs to be approved by the Bridge and cascaded to all personnel onboard.
  • Regular checking on engine room needs to be complied at all times. Any unusual or suspicious conditions of machineries or equipment should be informed immediately.

4. Conclusions

This may at first glance, seem like a DP undesired event caused by a power failure.

The removal of Thruster 1 from the DP system as a result of the mechanical failure of the seawater pump is the initiating event in this instance.

The loss of two more thrusters as a result of power failure was the main cause; however, human factor was the secondary (Triggering) cause that ultimately resulted in the outcome.

When the DPOs shut down Thruster No.1 this caused the vessel to lose required redundancy. The vessel continued to operate alongside the asset, without relaying the reduced status to all parties and was actually operating outside of its post worst case failure DP capability. It was no longer single fault tolerant and therefore not DP Class 2 compliant. 

The Master should have ceased operations and exited the 500m zone, in accordance with the approved ASOG.


The case studies and observations above have been compiled from information received by IMCA. All vessel, client, and operational data has been removed from the narrative to ensure anonymity. Case studies are not intended as guidance on the safe conduct of operations, but rather to assist vessel managers, DP operators, and technical crew.

IMCA makes every effort to ensure both the accuracy and reliability of the information, but it is not liable for any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

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