

Security Committee


Minutes of a meeting of the Association's Security Committee held on 5 February 2025 from 0900 GMT via videoconference

1 Competition law compliance policy

The IMCA Competition Law Compliance Policy was drawn to the attention of all present.

2 Welcome and attendance

The Chair welcomed members to the meeting. Apologies for absence were recorded, with the latest meeting attendance now as follows:



Also present or joining via videoconference were:

Nick Hough IMCA
Adrian White IMCA
Margaret Fitzgerald IMCA

3 Minutes of the previous meeting

3.1 Approval of the minutes

The minutes were agreed and would be duly signed as an accurate record by the Chair.

3.2 Changes to committee membership

Nick Hough reported that Pieter Matthee of Heerema Marine Contractors would join the committee. Members welcomed Pieter.

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4 IMCA update

Nick Hough provided a brief update on developments from the IMCA secretariat. IMCA has

- A new Head of Communications and Marketing Patrick Clift
- A new Events Manager, Winnie Dehaney
- A new Maritime Consultant working in Energy Transition, Nikos Vasileiadis

There is a new IMCA website, this requires all users to set up a new login.

5 Maritime Security issues

5.1 Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

This section of the meeting opened with a discussion of challenges relating to vessels safely transiting the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. There were warships of a number of different navies at work safeguarding maritime security in the area, including combined military missions such as the EUNAVFOR "Operation ASPIDES". Members discussed the possible escorting of vessels through the canal by warships of different navies.

There was however no rush to restart transiting the Canal in the context of a ceasefire in Gaza. It was noted that insurers have not changed their position on the risks involved in Red Sea/Suez Canal transits.

Margaret Fitzgerald noted that significant behind the scenes efforts by the IMO had been instrumental in securing the release of the 25 crew members of the vessel *Galaxy Leader* after a year in captivity. This release follows the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 2768 (2025) calling upon the Houthis to cease attack on commercial vessels.

Members discussed the Houthi attacks. The number of attacks may reduce. However, they seek to be recognised as a significant political entity, and the attacks provide a means to that end. There was a discussion of whether or not the Houthi would be constrained in the longer term by a lack of materials and ammunition.

Members discussed the risks involved in using armed guards, noting that vessels of one nationality had recently been detained after going into Eritrean waters.

5.2 Eastern Mediterranean

Increased geopolitical uncertainty means potential issues in terms of commercial endeavour and maritime security in this area. It was noted that Cyprus would be used as a staging post for possible large-scale evacuations of personnel if the situation in Gaza or Lebanon became much worse. This could have implications for members' operations.

5.3 Persian Gulf

It was noted that continued care was needed in transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and that some vessels were taking a route that minimised passage through or near Iranian waters. Some GNSS spoofing and jamming had been observed.

5.4 Ukraine and Black Sea

It was noted that there were still emergency alerts occurring as a result of drifting mines, but that sometimes these were false, as the objects sighted were in fact buoys. It was noted that there had been good shore-side support from the local authorities in Romanian and Turkish waters.

5.5 African waters: Mozambique, Gulf of Guinea

With regard to the Gulf of Guinea, members discussed the following:

- Recent security alerts offshore Cameroon and Gabon;
- An increase in reported incidents, and a notable increase in Russian military personnel, in and around Equatorial Guinea;
- Security challenges related to small fishing boats getting in the way of operations in Angolan waters.

With regard to Mozambique, members noted that the situation on the ground was improving. Some members had lifted a travel ban to the area but were recommending that personnel remain in their hotels. Members recommended careful "ground-truthing" of information received from security consultants, as this may not always be locally correct.

5.6 Asia Pacific / Taiwan

It was noted that the Singapore Straits had become something of a "hotspot" for sea robberies.

There was a discussion of the geopolitical position of Taiwan, in the vicinity of which a number of IMCA members had operations.

Margaret Fitzgerald drew attention to the delicate position of the IMO in regard to Taiwan, noting that a previous resolution of the UN (in 1954) was that there was "one China". The IMO as an agency of the UN was not permitted to mention Taiwan. This could constrain open and constructive discussion of maritime issues in the area that were of relevance to IMCA members and others. The matter was also on the agenda of the IMCA Marine Policy and Regulatory Affairs Committee (MPRA) and the Legal, Contracts, Insurance & Compliance (LCIC) Committee.

5.7 Mexico

Members noted that the operations of criminal (drug) cartels remained a security risk to personnel travelling in Mexico on company business.

There was a discussion of the potential geopolitical implications of both tariffs and also the recent proposed change of name for the Gulf of Mexico.

6 Joint Industry Security Group – update

Nick Hough gave a brief update of the work of the Joint Industry Security Group, noting the following:

- The proposed BMP M5 revision has been tidied up, prepared for publication and should be available soon.
- MISTO the JISG has been working on something to be called a Maritime Industry Security Threat Overview
 (MISTO), providing general maritime security information, based on an amalgamation of publicly available
 information and information obtained by the authors through a network of stakeholders in shipping,
 governments, and academia.

7 Subsea infrastructure

It was noted that security of subsea infrastructure is becoming more and more important at a geopolitical and commercial level. It can frequently be IMCA members repairing damage to such infrastructure. Attacks can take the form of "accidently" or even deliberately dragging anchors across pipes or cables. NATO has set up a "critical undersea infrastructure unit".

There was evidence that threat actors were collecting data relating to the location of subsea infrastructure, or making "phishing" attempts to secure such data from stakeholders.

8 Activism

There was a discussion of activism as having a potential negative impact not only marine operations offshore but also the onshore offices of companies involved in shipping and the energy industry, and also on the IMO at its London offices. It was noted that whilst major energy companies were often noticed first by activist organisations, they could also focus on less well-known contractors, some of which may be IMCA members.

9 Cybersecurity

The possibility of creating a useful forum on cybersecurity, similar to this committee, operating with similar rules, but for company information security officers and other persons with similar responsibilities, remained on the agenda.

9.1 Spoofing and jamming

Recent news articles on this, and noted issues with spoofing and jamming in certain areas, meant that it may be worth re-issuing an old Information Note on this subject.

Action: Nick Hough

- Jamming is intentionally blocking (the very weak) GNSS signals using radio frequency interference (RFI) to
 disrupt signals at GNSS frequencies, which prevents the GNSS receiver from detecting and processing the
 authentic signal. This happens because the strength of the jamming device exceeds that of the weaker GNSS
 signals received.
- **Spoofing** involves deliberately transmitting a fake GNSS signal to deceive receivers, causing them to compute incorrect data. This is NOT the same as Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, where altered or fabricated AIS data is transmitted to deceive AIS tracking systems regarding a ship's identity, position, and other information.

See https://safety4sea.com/britannia-mitigation-measures-for-gnss-jamming-and-spoofing/

10 Recent events and news update

IMCA had held a very well-attended and successful Global Summit at Utrecht in the Netherlands, on 3-4 December. Almost 200 delegates had been present. There were keynotes, panel discussions, fire-side chats, workshops, and audience Q&As. The winners of the IMCA Awards were announced. The destination for the IMCA Global Summit 2025 will be in Kuala Lumpur in late November 2025.

- IMCA MEI regional meeting 28 January, Mumbai
- ADNOC & IMCA Safety & Sustainability Summit, Abu Dhabi 30-31 January
- Singapore Information Fusion Centre "Shared Awareness meeting" 20 February

11 Un-minuted discussion of recent safety-related incidents

An un-minuted discussion took place.

12 Any other business

None.

13 D	ate a	nd loc	ation	of n	ext :	meetings
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TBC – Wednesday 7 May 2025 (videoconference)		
Signed as a true record	Name	Date	